A Poll that Many Doubted Would Happen
For months, analysts and sections of the Indian media cast deep doubts over whether Bangladesh could hold credible elections, amid surging radicalism, anti-India sentiment, and the political chaos that followed former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s dramatic ousting from office in August 2024. Analysts from New Delhi to Washington warned of a “security breakdown” scenario, a disputed outcome, or worse, an emergency rule that would derail the scheduled elections. New Delhi’s decision not to send official observers, while still talking about the need for “free, fair, inclusive, and credible” polls, added to this uncertainty. For a neighbor with deep economic, political and people-to-people ties, this decision indicated an unusual distance.
On February 12, however, with a voter turnout of 59.44%, the Bangladesh Election Commission held what it described as a “neutral and credible” election, acknowledged as such by observers from various countries and ultimately proving many skeptics wrong. For Nepal, preparing for its own election on March 5, 2026, following the Gen Z movement, the message could not be louder: democratic processes can still function effectively even in times of turmoil and transitions.
Interim Technocrats Under Pressure, but On the Clock
The period since Sheikh Hasina’s flight to India amid the student-led revolt in August 2024 was anything but smooth. Her exile to New Delhi became a diplomatic flashpoint and a challenge for maintaining bilateral relations. Dhaka has repeatedly pushed for her extradition; India has refused, citing legal and security concerns. In Dhaka, this has reinforced the idea that India conditionally prefers a particular kind of political partner rather than a stable Bangladesh. This is also a cautionary tale for Nepal, which in the past has borne the brunt of pressure from India on multiple occasions.
Led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the interim administration was thrust into office with an impossible mandate: to deliver free elections, reform broken institutions, and contain a resurgent radical Islamist movement. However, the interim setup was never meant to be an alternative center of power. Its legitimacy rested on a promise to reform some rules of the game and deliver an election on time without using “reform” as a pretext to postpone the vote.
Nepal’s interim government under Prime Minister Sushila Karki is in a similar position. It is not expected to transform the country in a few months. Its primary mandate is to ensure that the March 5 election takes place as scheduled, in an environment where parties compete but accept the basic rules.
49 Days that Changed Everything
Into the charged arena in Bangladesh walked Tarique Rahman. The Bangladesh National Party’s (BNP’s) acting chairman, and son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, returned to Dhaka on December 25, 2025, ending his 17 years of exile in London, just 49 days before the election. Under Hasina’s rule, the BNP had been decimated with its offices shut and leaders jailed. Upon his return, Rahman received a hero’s welcome. The symbolism was unmistakable: the prodigal son returning to claim what his family had long been denied. For detractors, it was the comeback of a controversial figure with unresolved cases and a polarizing legacy.
In his campaign, he pledged on transparency and good governance, recalibrating Bangladesh’s foreign policy, diversifying the economy beyond garments, and instituting a two-term limit for prime ministers. For many Bangladeshis exhausted by years of political confrontation and crisis, that was enough. Whether he delivers is another question. For now, though, Rahman embodies the hope of a nation exhausted by authoritarianism, chaos, and stagnation. For Nepal’s youth, the parallel to Rahman is Balen Shah, the rapper-turned-mayor of Kathmandu with majority support among Gen Z voters.
The BNP’s Emphatic Landslide
The BNP won 209 of 297 declared seats, a two-thirds majority which gave Rahman the mandate to form government. He dedicated his victory to those who “sacrificed for democracy” and struck a reconciliatory tone: no victory processions and rallies, but a day of prayer for “tranquility, security, and direction”.
The Student Party’s Harsh Lesson
If Rahman’s rise was a fairy tale, the National Citizen Party (NCP), the “student party” born from the uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina’s government, was a reminder of how hard it is to turn protest into power. The NCP, led by 26-year-old Nahid Islam, entered the race with enormous symbolic capital. Many of its leaders had stood at the frontlines of the August 2024 protests. However, this symbolism did not translate into tangible electoral gains, with the NCP winning just six out of thirty contested seats. The party suffered from the usual problems that plague revolutionary movements entering electoral politics: internal factionalism, shallow organizational capacity, and questionable alliances. Its coalition with Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islamist party that won a record 68 seats on its own, also alienated many liberal supporters without delivering meaningful seat-sharing gains. The NCP had neither the cadre nor the experience to compete against the BNP’s entrenched machinery.
In Nepal, we are already witnessing fragmentation among Gen Z groups. Many new faces are contesting independently, some under newly formed party banners, while others have forged alliances. However, without organizational depth, clarity of vision, and grassroots machinery, the transition from protest to meaningful political power can be far more complex than anticipated — and we may well see a similar outcome.
Nepal’s Test: Different Scenario, Same Stakes
The September Gen Z uprising that ousted former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli followed a strikingly similar script to the August 2024 movement in Dhaka: leaderless, digitally coordinated, driven by fury against corruption, censorship, and unaccountable governance. Like Bangladesh, a technocrat was selected to lead the country out of the chaos.
However, the similarities end there. Unlike Dhaka, where the Awami League was banned and the political field was fundamentally redrawn, Nepal’s major parties, including Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), CPN (Maoist Centre), and the Rastriya Swatantra Party, have all signalled endorsement and readiness for elections. The Election Commission has held formal consultations, with 65 parties registered and PM Karki having personally reviewed preparations across districts. There should be no skepticism about whether Nepal’s elections will take place. The institutional consensus is clear, preparations have been thorough, and, for once, the political fraternity is united in seeing the upcoming elections as the only way out. Unlike Bangladesh, Nepal’s immediate challenge is not the likelihood of the election poll, but rather the quality of the mandates produced and whether these mandates will lead to visible change.
Old Wine, New Bottle?
The deeper question for both nations is whether these elections will actually change anything. Both uprisings in Bangladesh and Nepal were fundamentally about the same issues of accountability, transparency, and anti-corruption. Yet in Bangladesh, the people ultimately turned to the BNP, a dynastic party with its own chequered history. In Nepal, the field is dominated by the same parties that have governed, and often disappointed, for three decades. The dependence on old mechanisms and structures raises a legitimate doubt: is what we are witnessing simply old wine in a new bottle?
People in both Bangladesh and Nepal are hoping for a new political dawn, but the baggage is heavy: challenging economic conditions, youth unemployment, inflation, and a deep reserve of public frustration, which does not simply dissipate upon changing who sits in office. Any political leader who is seen as genuinely addressing these anxieties seems poised to win. If Bangladesh’s February election was a reminder that history does not always follow the darkest predictions, Nepal’s March moment will show whether a similar uprising can result not just in a new government, but in a different way of doing politics. The burden of delivery will be far greater than the burden of winning the election alone. Rahman now carries that responsibility in Bangladesh. Whoever emerges as the new leader in Nepal will carry the burden too. The youth who burned parliaments and braved bullets did not do so for a mere rotation of power. They did it for transformation. Anything less, and the streets will speak again.
This NEFview is part of Nepal Economic Forum’s work on Bangladesh-Nepal relations, having held multiple roundtable discussions on the topic in coordination with the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) in Dhaka.
Sudip Bhaju is a private sector development expert with 15+ years of experience driving market-led transformations across South Asia and Rwanda. He also serves as the Director at Nepal Economic Forum.
